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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 339 
Accident time: 09:40 Accident Date: 02/07/2000 
Where it occurred: Qula-e-Muslim Village, 
Ward 7, Kabul 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident 
(survey) 
Date of main report: 14/08/2000 
ID original source: MI 05/2000  Name of source: IGM 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
grass/grazing area 
metal fragments 
rocks/stones 
Date record created: 21/02/2004 Date  last modified: 21/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: Task01-0101-007-660 Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
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Accident report 
Access to the accident data was denied by the MAC programme manager. A brief summary 
of the accident was provided by a professional researcher who had access to the original 
documents.  That summary is reconstructed here. 
[Map references are not recorded in the MAC records, so the minefield task number (when 
available) is entered in the Map Ref field at the Incident/Accident tab as an identifying 
feature.] 
The Victim [whose name was not recorded] had been employed in demining for six years. He 
had last attended a revision course on 25-27th June, 2000, and had last been on leave 26 
days before the accident. The area had previously been surveyed by the same team carrying 
out another survey at the time of the accident. The ground was described as “grazing land”, 
some normal and some hard with bushes, grass and stones. The weather was described as 
being “a bit hot”. The mines in the area had been laid by the Soviet occupying forces. The 
mines were laid in a “very dense” pattern to protect military posts and ammunition stores.  
The Survey Team was divided into two and the group that had the accident began making a 
survey lane at the bottom of the hill. The Victim marked a detector reading and when he 
investigated it, found some fragments. He put the detector aside and moved to collect stones 
to construct a Turning Point and mark the cleared survey lane. While walking in the survey 
lane (within the safety margin or “overlap”) he stepped on a PMN mine.  
The accident occurred at 09:40. The Victim was extracted and taken to a safe site at 09:45, 
when a tourniquet was applied.  Further removed to safer site by 10:00. He was taken to an 
ambulance by 10:30 and to ICRC hospital at 10:45.  An air CASEVAC occurred at 14:10 and 
he was admitted in CMH hospital Peshawar at 15:30. 
The Team leader said that the accident occurred 1.4 meters beyond the cleared-area 
markings, so suggesting that the Victim had overstepped the safe zone. However the Victim 
stated that he had just cleared to this location. 
The investigating team found several detector indications in “cleared areas”. 
The investigators reported that readings on the mine detectors were almost continuous in this 
area, and it is likely that the victim interpreted these as fragments. Because of the false alarm 
rate, all indications were not being investigated. They remarked that it was not possible to use 
dogs in this area because of the terrain.  
The investigators observed that the Victim’s detector had no handle, so may have been 
operated too high above the ground.  
 
Conclusion 
The investigators identified poor quality control by the Team Leader. They said that the Team 
Leader must have known about the surveyors ignoring detector indications. They concluded 
that the accident was preventable. 
  
Victim Report 
Victim number: 427 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: surveyor  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 5 hours 50 minutes 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: not recorded 
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Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Leg 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “inadequate survey” because it seems likely 
that the mine had been missed by the Victim and in the previous survey of the area. The 
Secondary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the field supervisors were 
apparently allowing the surveyors to leave metal fragments in the ground. 
The inadequate medical provision referenced in the notes relates to the unacceptable length 
of time it too for the Victim to reach a surgical facility. 
The failure of the MAC to allow access to accident reports means that the report made here is 
acknowledged to be unsatisfactory. It will be revised if access is ever allowed. The failure of 
the MACC to act with transparency is bound to raise questions over what they have to hide.   
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